The Eternal Problem of Collective Security: From the League of Nations to the United Nations by Kolb, Robert
Geneva values and
the search for peace
THE ETERNAL PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY:
FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Robert Kolb
Professor of International Law at the Universities of Neuchâtel, Berne
and Geneva (University Center of International Humanitarian Law)
DEFINITION OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
By the term “collective security” we tend to designate a system geared to the keeping 
of the peace and the avoidance of war on the basis of two essential elements:
(1) Triggering event. First, there is the defi nition of a set of facts which gives 
rise to collective action (a casus foederis). The most obvious fact of this type 
is aggression of State A. by State B. But this casus can also be threats to 
the peace, egregious human rights violations, illegitimate régimes, etc. In 
such a situation, collective security demands from all States parties to the 
system to league together against the aggressor and to adopt measures (if 
necessary including military force) to defeat his designs. The maxim is All 
for One! In this sense, collective security is nothing but a particular peace 
alliance. Its distinctive feature with respect to traditional alliances is that it 
aims at universality, i.e. to include all the States of the world. When this 
objective is reached, there is no State “outside” the system. Thus, contrary 
to traditional alliances where the aggressor comes from the “outside”, in a 
system of universal collective security, the potential aggressor comes from 
the “inside”. Moreover, the tendency to increase international frictions 
among hostile alliances disappears with collective security, since the system 
is not directed against any particular State or other system.
(2) Collective, Binding Decision-Making. Second, the establishment of 
authoritative collective decision making by a collective organ: an 
international collective and unique organ, being the representative of the 
international community itself, qualifi es the casus foederis. Its decision 
has binding force on the member States of the system.
It stands to experience that a system of perfect collective security has never 
been realized in history, and may never be realized. We have had two models 
approximating collective security, in the L.o.N and in the UN, both with their 
peculiar strengths and shortcomings.
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SIMILARITIES OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
AND UNITED NATIONS SYSTEMS
Looking from a very broad perspective, one fi nds that the two systems present 
similar lines of evolution. These two lines seem twins in destiny, a new inseparable 
Castor and Pollux couple, in a story as sad as the mythological one. Each one of 
these lines is tearing the system into opposite directions.
On the one hand, there is collective security as announced in the texts of the 
constitutive instruments, with the trumpet of generosity and hopeful optimism. 
It is well organized and fairly muscled on paper. And it displays a benevolent 
tendency to be broadened to new situations as the need arises, by increasing 
the scope of action of the common organ, the Council or the Assembly. On the 
other hand, the members States progressively sterilize the system provided for in 
the constitutive instruments by a series of restrictive interpretations of its core 
provisions, emptying it of all practical impact. It is as if, realizing the potential 
threat to their vital interests and sovereignty linked to an international government 
on security, the States were keen to minimize the practical infl uence of the new 
system. More realistic and traditional means of keeping security, asking for fewer 
sacrifi ces, like alliances and neutrality, seem to have generally their preference. 
Thus, what was conceded with the one hand in 1919 or in 1945 seems to have 
been quickly taken away with the other.
It fl ows from the preceding passages that no system of collective security has 
properly functioned up to today. Criticism directed to collective security must 
therefore correctly be taken as criticism into the possibility to have such a system 
functioning at all, or into the ways by which the system has been sterilized in a given 
situation, but not to the concept as such. Can it work? Why has it not worked? Only 
those preliminary questions can be asked and answered on the basis of experience. 
The answers to it are fairly clear: collective security seems a too rational and abstract 
construct to fi t political realities, particular interests, alliances and ideological 
closeness among some States across the lines of its geometric requirements. For 
collective security, States are always abstract entities A., B., C., etc. They are 
interchangeable. In real politics, they are not. And yet collective security seems 
indispensable: nothing would be gained and much lost to give it up altogether.
Let us look into somewhat more detail how the mentioned twin lines of initial 
aspiration and progressive dwindling have interacted in the League of Nations and 
in the United Nations.
COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE LEAGUE
The system of collective security of the League is spelled out in Articles 10-16 of 
the Covenant. It was remarkably drafted, even if the novelty of the experience and 
the necessary compromises left some loopholes and questions open. The whole 
system was based on a double premise:
(i) Collective security is granted against inter-State aggression. Thus, the 
triggering event is an aggression of State A. against State B.
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(ii) The determination of aggression in the system turns on the peaceful 
settlement of dispute mechanisms. The drafters of the Covenant 
believed that the immediate cause for war was the fact that disputes 
arising among States were not solved by a peaceful and compulsory 
means of settlement. Thus, they imposed as a duty a previous attempt 
at settlement of the dispute. If a State tried to solve its dispute with 
another through the mechanisms provided for, but the result was failure, 
it could go to war to safeguard their rights. Conversely, if a State did not 
make use of the peaceful settlement mechanisms or broke off from them 
prematurely, using instead force, it was designed as the aggressor for the 
purposes of the collective security system.
The League system received some generous development, especially on one point. 
In the League practice, especially since the Manchurian War (1931), it became 
accepted that all forcible measures short of war (police operations, armed reprisals, 
armed interventions, etc.) did also trigger the collective security mechanism. “War” 
was at that time considered a formal legal régime. It was triggered by a declaration 
of war embodying the subjective intention of each belligerent to consider oneself at 
war with another State. A series of forcible measures looking like war but not fl owing 
from such a formal state of affairs had thus remained in the limbo’s and threatened 
the effectiveness of the system. In the League practice, the system was strengthened 
by the extension of security mechanisms to such broader situations, ironically at the 
very moment when the collective security started its rapid decline (1931).
On the other hand, the system early received fatal blows. A series of spurious 
interpretations had indeed sterilized the scheme of the Covenant. Almost all the 
key articles for collective security were reduced to inglorious proportions and 
sometimes to practical meaninglessness:
– Article 10. This provision of the Covenant protects the territorial integrity of 
the members States. Taken seriously, it means a non-aggression agreement 
among the members. The unfortunate link with the territorial order of 
Versailles – considered by the vanquished powers as a diktat of power – led 
in due course to a retrograding of this provision, which became a sort of 
“moral” obligation deprived of sanctions.
– Article 11. This provision affi rms the collective interest of all States and of 
the League in matters of peace and war all over the world. The maintenance 
of peace was thus framed in Article 11 as an interest erga omnes, with the 
League as an institutional depositary. In the second part of the twenties, 
the virtues of this article as a basis for an implied power of the League 
to develop some form of preventive action was discovered. However, the 
rich potentialities of that discovery were immediately frustrated by the 
requirement that all action of the League under Article 11 shall require 
the unanimous agreement of all the States represented in the acting organ 
(Assembly or Council), including the parties to the dispute. It therefore 
suffi ced that one State disagreed in order to freeze all action. One of the 
States in dispute – that one having to loose from objective examination of 
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the case – was always bound to dissent. Thus, the lofty invention under 
Article 11 was immediately turned down.
– Article 15. This provision gives the Council the mandate to try to resolve 
disputes before hostilities break out. However, progressively, the Council 
failed to honor that injunction. It intervened only after hostilities had 
begun. It convened often late and was uninformed. It avoided leadership 
and decision, preferring procrastination, creation of commissions of 
enquiry and mediation, debates on formal aspects, etc. In any case, the 
Council did not have under Article 15 the power to impose a solution to 
the dispute, unless all the States (not counting the parties to the dispute) 
agreed. That was rarely to happen.
– Article 16. This provision witnessed the most serious attack. It deals with 
sanctions by the League and its members if one State aggresses another in 
violation of its undertakings under the Covenant. Very early, already in 
the Second Assembly, the members States put forward some interpretative 
resolutions narrowing its scope. They affi rmed that: (1) there was no 
obligation whatsoever, under Article 16, to participate to a military 
enforcement action, unless by form of special agreement of a State; (2) the 
casus foederis was not to be determined by the Council of the League (it was 
even disputed if it could recommend on that matter!) but by each members 
State itself. This self-judging determination broke the bones of the system 
and meant reducing to naught the principle that non-military sanctions 
were, unlike military ones, automatic. What is left to an automatic sanction 
if there is no social organ to determine that the conditions of its application 
are met? Any State can just avoid qualifying a State as being in violation of 
the Covenant in order to avoid the sanctions against it.
Such a weak and decentralized system could not work and could not provide 
security. Thereby it automatically aggravated insecurity, since nobody could hope 
to be protected by collective security. In effect, since 1935 (aggression of Italy in 
Ethiopia) the system was abandoned. The timid attempt at sanction against Italy 
by some sanctionist member States had failed. Since that moment, the policy of 
the members was in fuga salus: they returned to the traditional alliances or to 
policies of neutrality. The road was paved for the war.
COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS
The Charter’s system of collective security is spelled out in Chapter VII, Articles 
39ff of that instrument. It has drawn the consequences from the failure of the 
League system and attempts to rebuild it on strengthened ground. Thus, the 
Security Council is given a great array of powers. The casus foederis is enlarged. It 
is not only inter-State aggression, but namely also “threats to the peace”. This is a 
remarkable expression giving a wide array of discretionary powers to the S.C. and 
giving some glimpse of global governance. Moreover, the S.C. alone decides on the 
casus foederis; the sanctions adopted in its resolutions are automatic and binding1; 
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military enforcement has to take place through the channel of armed forces put at 
the disposal of the Council already in peacetime. The S.C. is moreover a permanent 
organ. Unlike the League Council, it does not need to be called in session after a 
crisis has erupted.
As in the League, the system witnessed some remarkable extensions. In the 
1990ies, the S.C. interpreted the fl exible concept of “threat to the peace” so as 
to cover a series of new situations, ranging from civil wars (Liberia), to failed 
States (Somalia) and to dictatorial and oppressive régimes (Haiti). In the last 
decade, the emerging concept of “human security” further enlarged the concept of 
peace and peacekeeping: questions of poverty, human rights, conditions of living, 
environmental matters, and the like, are now perceived as part and parcel of any 
effort to keep the peace. Coupled with collective security (which backs the Council 
under Chapter VII) this leads to a picture where the way is paved for some form of 
world government. The “peace” becomes the Trojan horse that defi nitively erodes 
the sovereignty of the States and gives way to S.C. governance.
But this is again only one side of the story. The other is the ever-recurring 
backslash towards containment, if not sterilization, of such a dangerous threat to 
State sovereignty. There have been many means to frustrate the system, not all being 
on the same level of eminence. Let us just mention three aspects at this juncture:
– The Veto. Article 27, § 3, of the UN Charter ensures the right of veto of 
the fi ve permanent members of the S.C. (US, USSR, UK, China, France). 
It is not truly “granting” that right to these States, since the right of veto 
preexists to the Charter. Under the League Covenant, under the general rule 
on unanimity (Article 5 of the Covenant), all States had enjoyed that right 
of veto. In 1945, it was restricted to the Big Five. The obvious aim was not 
to stretch the Organization beyond what it could bear: if an enforcement 
action could be decided against a great military power, the Organization 
would be torn away and the Third World War would erupt. Conversely, a 
military or other enforcement action can hardly succeed if it is not backed 
by all major powers. The League experience had been conclusive on it. The 
veto went well beyond what was expected by most. It indeed resulted in 
freezing the system of collective security, because it was used for decades 
not only to shield the permanent members from enforcement action, 
but also, by a sort of proxy, to protect all the ideological clients of the 
superpowers throughout the Cold War World. This resulted in an almost 
complete stalemate of the system.
– The fate of Articles 43ff of the Charter. These provisions spell out the 
arrangements for a UN-led military operation against a sanctioned States. 
Article 43, in particular, calls on the members States to make available to 
the S.C. armed forces. These armed forces are to be put under the control 
of the Organization, which then carries out a potential enforcement action 
on its own behalf and in its name. It comes to no surprise that the members 
States did not honor such an undertaking. It is much too dangerous to 
national sovereignty to hand over to the UN armed forces making of the 
World Organization itself a power, if not a super-State. When Secretary 
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General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recalled Article 43 in his Agenda for Peace 
(1992), he was quickly told by the great powers to quiet down. Giving 
effectiveness to article 43 is clearly not in their agenda.
– Armed action in circumvention of the Charter. In the recent years, we have 
witnessed a particular Western policy. It holds that if the S.C. does not give 
free reign to use force in a given context to the requesting States, namely 
to the US and its allied, self-proclaimed coalitions of States can step in 
and, arguing that the S.C. is stymied be the “veto” (sometimes simply the 
lack of majority, though!), act unilaterally as they see fi t. This policy has 
led to further erosion of the system of collective security and has increased 
– as in the late 1930’ – insecurity. It is clear that “rogue” States will do 
everything to rearm with weapons of mass destruction if that is the only 
effective deterrent for a potential aggressor. The agreement reached these 
days between the US and Northern Korea precisely bears testimony to this. 
The sign given to the world is once more: look for yourselves. Every time 
in history when this course prevailed on questions of security, insecurity 
increased and wars fi nally erupted.
CONCLUSION
Collective Security is one of these things which are eminently reasonable, but 
which cannot apparently be fully realized by Man. Reason and reality here stand 
in an unbridgeable confl ict. Security dilemmas always separate Machiavellian 
pseudo-wisdom on the one hand and true commitment to the common weal 
on the other, making the fi rst appear a condition of survival and the second a 
lofty hope replete with dangerous delusions. It therefore appears improbable – 
and this is disturbing – that we will get any truly improved system of collective 
security in the future. But this does not necessarily mean abyssal pessimism. For 
one may act to improve things so far as is possible, according to the wise French 
formula of “bonne volonté sans illusion”. In any case, giving up the hope for 
collective security (or multilateralism in security matters) is not a meaningful 
choice. Indeed, any alternative is much worse that even a partial and insuffi cient 
collective security scheme. We are thus bound to work for it, assuming perhaps 
that Sisyphus is happy!
Notes
1 Article 25 of the Charter.
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